Kerryman, the intel analysts who produced the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, which stated with "high confidence" (the highest rating assigned) that Saddam had chemical and biological weapons and missiles were not operating from a "plausible denial" scenario. Remember, Saddam not only had but USED (on his own people as well as during the war with Iran) WMD's. Thus, we knew he had them at one point. Absent a stream of reporting indicating that those weapons had either been destroyed or exported, there was no logical basis on which an analyst could have concluded that they were no longer there--unless you subscribe to the "they were beamed up by the Starship Enterprise" scenario.
"Plausible denial" is used in support of operations you want to keep secret or, if you can't keep them secret, at least hide your own hand. (As in the CIA funneling arms to the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the 80's, when they were fighting the Russians, through the intermediary of the Pakistanis.) You don't use plausible denial in support of the conclusions of a finished intelligence study . . . unless, that is, the intelligence agency in question is deliberately trying to confuse the people running the country, or the national leadership is "cooking the books" on the intelligence produced. In the case of Iraq, the Senate Intelligence Committee's investigation produced no evidence that any analyst bowed to any sort of political pressure to change his conclusions.
Last edited by L. Brown; 02/09/09 09:40 AM.
