Ed, re your response #5 above, my point is that many lenders (especially CW and IM) did not give a rip about the quality of the loan once they had made it.
I've been out of the loop for a few days, at Mayo Clinic, yada, yada...but now I'm up to speed, let me share with you the substance of a call I received just as I left:
An old friend is the senior partner of a business-type law firm and is on the board of several local banks. According to, let's call him Wes, the beginning of the sub-prime fiasco was in the late 1970s (1977-Jimmy Carter--Community Reinvestment Act) when banks were no longer free to protect their depositors and shareholders as they deemed fit, but became a tool of government to "Level the economic playing-field" downward. This was not the "poison pill" that it is now accused of being; just the first degradation of prudent lending practices, pretty much painted over with mortgage insurance.
FDIC protected the banks' depositors to a point, and the less-desirable loans had MGIC insurance to bring them up to speed vis-a-vis Fannie Mae and the secondary market. Remember the constant reminders on the financial news programs telling sub-standard borrowers to keep checking their pay-down on their mortgage so they can ask to cancel their monthly mortgage insurance premium?
According to Wes, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac required 20% down and the mortgage loans had to fit a certain financial and physical template (appraisal, earnings, total debt, proper zoning, available city sewer and water and other utilities). The mortgage insurance painted over some shortfalls of down-stroke, and if the secondary market rejected the loan, the bank often kept it for their own portfolio...and here is where my banker friend hits the crux...
Wes says that whenever his bank kept a loan that was declined by Fannie May or Freddie Mac, invariably a large percentage of these sub-standards became problem loans. This doesn't mean "worthless" or written off or foreclosed, but simply loans a banker wished that he had never made. IN OTHER WORDS, Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's criteria was valid, but during 1990s, under Bill Clinton, this changed for the worse.
Bill Clinton pressured F-Mae and F-Mac to handle increasingly riskier mortgage loans. In 1996 the Dept. of Housing and Urban Development
ORDERED F-Mae & F-Mac to ensure that 42% of loans they handled went to below-median-income borrowers and another 12% had to be "special affordable" mortgages for people with less than 60% of median income. Our government required that the government-sponsored lenders (F-Mae & F-Mac) bundle loan packages that, by definition, were 54% below average! And these federally-guaranteed loan packages were sold to private investors, insurance companies, and pension funds. Now that they have gone stinko, guess who's holding the bag?
In 1995 a reform bill authored by a Nebraska republican was kept off the floor of the senate by democrats, and died. Meanwhile, the Clinton administration pressed the banks to make ever-increasingly sub-prime loans...no wonder that the mortgage brokers "...didn't give a rip about the quality of the loans..." It was government policy to loan to 54% of the population that was below the median qualification, and some (12%) were 40% below average qualifications. This defines "SUB-PRIME," and it was government policy.
Then the floodgates were opened by Bill Clinton in the last days of his administration in 2000, when he failed to veto the repeal of the Anti-Bucket Shop Law of 1907. And why should he have bothered? The repeal bill passed the house by a veto-proof majority, and was unanimous in the senate! As Pogo often said: "We have found the enemy and he is us." The "bucket shops" re-opened as Credit Default Swap security sellers who bet the sub-prime mortgages were going to default.
None of this has anything to do with originating loans for fees or servicing loans for fees; the issue is the quality of the loans, not how they originated, or where payments are made or who keeps the books. The problem is that our government took a viable mortgage industry that since 1938, with the inception of the government sponsored F-Mae, which purchased loans made to worthy individuals, and reversed the qualifications, favoring below average "sub-prime" borrowers. I don't understand your fixation with brokers earning fees or servicing organizations being compensated for handling monthly payments.
The problem was that F-Mae and F-Mac could not decline bad loans. These loans were packaged with good ones, sort of like a few over-ripe rotting apples in a bushel. The real problem is that no one knows how many rotten apples are in each bushel, and when in doubt, do nothing. Thus the loan-package securities are no longer being bought and sold; meaning "no liquidity." Why risk rotten apples after the orchard has become famous for having exercised no restraint when incorporating the bad with the good. Who has time or incentive to sort through every bushel to reinspect for what should have been selected out at harvest? And, besides, with the passage of time, all the apples are starting to go beyond their prime, or so says the drive-by media. EDM